

# POPULISM AS A COMMUNICATION STRATEGY: A CASE STUDY OF THE FREEDOM AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY PARTY AND TOMIO OKAMURA

Jakub CHARVÁT – Denisa CHARVÁTOVÁ – Eva NIKLESOVÁ

## ABSTRACT:

Democratic systems face several challenges, many of which are based on current societal sentiments. Western societies may enjoy life in prosperity but many of their citizens are dissatisfied as they live in fear of the future. While the established political parties are unable to respond effectively, populist parties work effectively with fear. Thus, populism has been on the rise. Although populism appears in the communication of parties at both ends of the left-right axis, in most cases it is associated with the extreme right. A key element in the success of populist parties is their communication strategy while social media have become an ideal platform for populist political communication. The single-country case study focuses on Czech politics, in which this area was occupied by the Freedom and Direct Democracy Party, led by Tomio Okamura. The study analyses the political communication of the party and of Okamura, especially its content and form.

## KEY WORDS:

Czech politics, Facebook, Freedom and Direct Democracy Party, populist political communication, Tomio Okamura

## 1 Introduction

Today's democratic systems face several challenges and problems, many of which are based on current societal sentiments. Although Western societies may enjoy living in prosperity, many of their citizens are dissatisfied because they live in insecurity, or even in fear of their life situation in the years to come. As established political parties are unable to respond effectively to such stimuli from the public, these citizens are forced to look for various political alternatives. Populist parties, on the other hand, are able to work effectively



Mgr. Jakub Charvát, Ph.D.  
Department of Political Science and Anglophone Studies  
Metropolitan University Prague  
Dubečská 900/10  
100 00 Prague 10 – Strašnice  
Czech Republic  
jakub.charvat@mup.cz

Jakub Charvát is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science and Anglophone Studies, Metropolitan University Prague, Czech Republic, and at the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Arts, Jan Evangelista Purkyně University in Ústí nad Labem, Czech Republic. In his research, he focuses on the politics of electoral reform, electoral studies, political communication, party politics and contemporary history and politics of Central Europe.



Mgr. Denisa Charvátová  
Department of Media Studies  
Metropolitan University Prague  
Dubečská 900/10  
100 00 Prague 10 – Strašnice  
Czech Republic  
denisa.charvatova@gmail.com

Denisa Charvátová is a Ph.D. student at the Department of Media Studies, Metropolitan University Prague, Czech Republic. Her research focuses on populism, political communication and social media.



Mgr. Eva Niklesová, Ph.D.  
Department of Media Studies  
Metropolitan University Prague  
Dubečská 900/10  
100 00 Praha 10 – Strašnice  
Czech Republic  
eva.niklesova@mup.cz

Eva Niklesová is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Media Studies, Metropolitan University Prague, Czech Republic. Her main research fields are media language, communication culture, mediated political communication, media education and relations between literary science and media communication theory.

with fear, thanks to which populism has been on the rise<sup>1</sup> and represents one of the major political trends in contemporary democracies across Europe<sup>2</sup> and in the USA.<sup>3</sup>

A key part of the success of populist parties is their communication strategy,<sup>4</sup> especially via social networking sites. Social media perfectly suit the populist style of communication because they are anti-elitist (as they are easily accessible) and allow for direct communication and interaction with followers.<sup>5</sup> Thus, social media have become an ideal platform for populist political communication<sup>6</sup> by offering (not only) populist politicians a simpler and less expensive tool of political communication with people, including the ‘new’ generation of citizens,<sup>7</sup> which has already ‘grown up’ with social networking. With the advent of social media, the path was opened for political actors to reach a wider circle of citizens and potential voters without being subject to the logic of the so-called old media. *Facebook* and *Twitter* have allowed politicians to spread their message without outside interference and intermediaries,<sup>8</sup> although social networking platforms are essentially intermediaries. In this way, they have significantly contributed to the transformation of the current prevailing patterns of political communication, and in addition highlighted the existing social divisions.

## 2 Objectives and Methods

So far, there is no universally valid definition of “populism”. There are a number of approaches for its examination, many of which, however, are incomplete.<sup>9</sup> Although the different approaches in some aspects overlap and complement each other,<sup>10</sup> it is possible to identify three overriding concepts on how to view populism:

1 For more information, see: TAGGART, P.: *Populism*. Philadelphia : Open University Press, 2000, p. 73-84; TAGGART, P.: Populism and Representative Politics in Contemporary Europe. In *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 2004, Vol. 9, No. 3, p. 282; MUDDE, C.: The Populist Zeitgeist. In *Government and Opposition*, 2004, Vol. 39, No. 4, p. 542; MOFFITT, B.: *The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style, and Representation*. Stanford : Stanford University Press, 2016.

2 Compare to: KUBÁT, M. et al.: *Populismus v časech krize*. Prague : Karolinum, 2016; AALBERG, T. et al.: *Populist Political Communication in Europe*. New York : Routledge, 2017; WODAK, R., KRZYŻANOWSKI, M.: Right-Wing Populism in Europe & USA: Contesting Politics & Discourse beyond “Orbanism” and “Trumpism”. In *Journal of Language and Politics*, 2017, Vol. 16, No. 4, p. 471-484; NAXERA, V. et al.: To Protect National Sovereignty from the EU? The 2019 EP Elections and Populist Parties in V4 Countries. In *UNESCO Journal*, 2020, Vol. 54, No. 3, p. 71-106.

3 See: OLIVER, J. E., RAHN, W. M.: Rise of the Trumpenfolk: Populism in the 2016 Elections. In *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, 2016, Vol. 667, No. 1, p. 189-206; WHITE, J. K.: Donald Trump and the Scourge of Populism. In *The Forum. A Journal of Applied Research in Contemporary Politics*, 2016, Vol. 14, No. 3, p. 265-279; KREIS, R.: The “Tweet Politics” of President Trump. In *Journal of Language and Politics*, 2017, Vol. 16, No. 4, p. 607-618; MONTGOMERY, M.: Populism in Performance? Trump on the Stump and His Audience. In *Journal of Language and Politics*, 2020, Vol. 19, No. 5, p. 733-765; OSWALD, M.: Populismus in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika. In LAMMERT, C., SIEWERT, M. B., VORMANN, B. (eds.): *Handbuch Politik USA*. Wiesbaden : Springer VS, 2020, p. 55-72; SCHNEIKER, A.: Populist Leadership: The Superhero Donald Trump as Savior in Times of Crisis. In *Political Studies*, 2020, Vol. 68, No. 4, p. 857-874; LOWNDES, J.: Trump and the Populist Presidency. In OSTIGUY, P., PANIZZA, F., MOFFITT, B. (eds.): *Populism in Global Perspective: A Performative and Discursive Approach*. New York, London : Routledge, 2021, p. 118-135.

4 AALBERG, T., DE VREESE, C. H.: Introduction: Comprehending Populist Political Communication. In AALBERG, T., ESSER, F., REINEMANN, C. (eds.): *Populist Political Communication in Europe*. New York : Routledge, 2017, p. 3.

5 See: ENGESSER, S. et al.: Populism and Social Media: How Politicians Spread a Fragmented Ideology. In *Information, Communication & Society*, 2017, Vol. 20, No. 8, p. 1109-1126; SCHNEIKER, A.: Populist Leadership: The Superhero Donald Trump as Savior in Times of Crisis. In *Political Studies*, 2020, Vol. 68, No. 4, p. 857-874.

6 Compare to: MOFFITT, B.: *The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style, and Representation*. Stanford : Stanford University Press, 2016; MOFFITT, B.: Populism 2.0: Social Media and the False Allure of ‘Unmediated’ Representation. In FITZI, G., MACKERT, J., TURNER, S. T. (eds.): *Populism and the Crisis of Democracy. Volume 2: Politics, Social Movements*. London : Routledge, 2019, p. 30-46; POSTILL, J.: Populism and Social Media: A Global Perspective. In *Media, Culture & Society*, 2018, Vol. 40, No. 5, p. 755; LIPINSKI, A., STEPINSKA, A.: Polish Right-Wing Populisms in the Era of Social Media. In *Problems of Post-Communism*, 2019, Vol. 66, No. 7, p. 78.

7 AALBERG, T., DE VREESE, C. H.: Introduction: Comprehending Populist Political Communication. In AALBERG, T., ESSER, F., REINEMANN, C. (eds.): *Populist Political Communication in Europe*. New York : Routledge, 2017, p. 6.

8 For more information, see: BRACCIALE, R., MARTELLA, A.: Define the Populist Political Communication Style: The Case of Italian Political Leaders on Twitter. In *Information, Communication & Society*, 2017, Vol. 20, No. 9, p. 1310-1329; ERNST, N. et al.: Populists Prefer Social Media over Talk Shows: An Analysis of Populist Messages and Stylistic Elements across Six Countries. In *Social Media + Society*, 2019, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 1-14; MOFFITT, B.: Populism 2.0: Social Media and the False Allure of ‘Unmediated’ Representation. In FITZI, G., MACKERT, J., TURNER, S. T. (eds.): *Populism and the Crisis of Democracy. Volume 2: Politics, Social Movements*. London : Routledge, 2019, p. 30-46.

9 TAGGART, P.: Populism and Representative Politics in Contemporary Europe. In *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 2004, Vol. 9, No. 3, p. 275.

10 HAVLÍK, V., PINKOVÁ, A.: Seeking a Theoretical Framework: How to Define and Identify Populist Parties? In HAVLÍK, V. (ed.): *Populist Political Parties in East-Central Europe*. Brno : Masaryk University, 2012, p. 17-37.

(1) as an ideology;<sup>11</sup> (2) as a so-called thin-ideology,<sup>12</sup> which can be combined with other ‘full-fledged’ ideologies;<sup>12</sup> or (3) as a communication strategy<sup>13</sup> and political communication style<sup>14</sup> building on the dichotomy between ‘us’ (i.e., the pure people) and ‘them’ (i.e., the evil and/or corrupt political elites) whereas the latter group is seen as not acting according to the will of ordinary people, or even acting against it.<sup>15</sup> At the same time, three fundamental elements of populism, which occur across the different approaches, can be identified and those are the people-centrism, anti-elitism and ‘the others’ which are a kind of excluded and ‘dangerous’ group.<sup>16</sup>

We have selected the last-mentioned perspective as the default for our single-country research focusing on Czech politics as we consider populism to be a political communication strategy. Although populism appears in the communication of political actors at both ends of the one-dimensional left-right axis and from the far left to far right,<sup>17</sup> often in the case of opposition parties,<sup>18</sup> in recent years there has been increased research attention paid especially to extreme right-wing parties.<sup>19</sup> In the Czech party system recently, this role has been taken by the Freedom and Direct Democracy Party (SPD), among whose founders and leaders over its whole period of existence stands Tomio Okamura.<sup>20</sup> Even though the representatives of SPD themselves, from the moment of its creation, have repeatedly proclaimed its ambition to be a radical movement with radical political aims, they at the same time refuse the assignment of SPD to the far right. However, through the topics of its focus – primarily we mean radicalism, hard Euroscepticism and nativism in its manifestos and communication, as well as the selection of its (foreign) partners – SPD has repeatedly shown its belonging to the far right.<sup>21</sup>

*Facebook* was selected for the research of SPD’s political communication, mainly for the following reasons. The recent Schulz’s study revealed that populist citizens prefer *Facebook* over *Twitter* as a source of political information.<sup>22</sup> Moreover, even though Czech politicians are active on social media – whether it

11 See: CANOVAN, M.: Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy. In *Political Studies*, 1999, Vol. 47, No. 1, p. 2-16; CANOVAN, M.: Taking Politics to the People: Populism as the Ideology of Democracy. In MÉNY, Y., SUREL, Y. (eds.): *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*. London : Palgrave, 2002, p. 25-44; MUDDE, C.: *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2007.

12 See: MUDDE, C.: The Populist Zeitgeist. In *Government and Opposition*, 2004, Vol. 39, No. 4, p. 542-563; STANLEY, B.: The Thin Ideology of Populism. In *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 2008, Vol. 13, No. 1, p. 95-110; MUDDE, C., KALTWASSER, C. R.: Studying Populism in Comparative Perspective: Reflections on the Contemporary and Future Research Agenda. In *Comparative Political Studies*, 2018, Vol. 51, No. 13, p. 1667-1693; ROODUIJN, M.: What Unites the Voter Bases of Populist Parties? Comparing the Electorates of 15 Populist Parties in Western Europe. In *European Political Science Review*, 2018, Vol. 10, No. 3, p. 351-368.

13 See: AALBERG, T., DE VREESE, C. H.: Introduction: Comprehending Populist Political Communication. In AALBERG, T., ESSER, F., REINEMANN, C. (eds.): *Populist Political Communication in Europe*. New York : Routledge, 2017, p. 3-11; BRACCIALE, R., MARTELLA, A.: Define the Populist Political Communication Style: The Case of Italian Political Leaders on Twitter. In *Information, Communication & Society*, 2017, Vol. 20, No. 9, p. 1310-1329.

14 See: JAGERS, J., WALGRAVE, S.: Populism as Political Communication Style: An Empirical Study of Political Parties Discourse in Belgium. In *European Journal of Political Research*, 2007, Vol. 46, No. 3, p. 319-345; MOFFITT, B., TORMEY, S.: Rethinking Populism: Politics, Mediatization and Political Style. In *Political Studies*, 2014, Vol. 62, No. 2, p. 381-397; MOFFITT, B.: *The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style, and Representation*. Stanford : Stanford University Press, 2016; WEYLAND, K.: Populism: A Political-Strategic Approach. In KALTWASSER, C. R., TAGGART, P., ESPEJO, P. O. (eds.): *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 48-72.

15 For more information, see: MUDDE, C., KALTWASSER, C. R.: *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2017.

16 Compare to: REINEMANN, C. et al.: Populist Political Communication: Toward a Model of Its Causes, Forms, and Effects. In AALBERG, T., ESSER, F., STRÖMBÄCK, J. (eds.): *Populist Political Communication in Europe*. New York : Routledge, 2017, p. 12-28; BENNETT, S. et al.: *Populist Communication on Social Media: Research Report*. Budapest : Centre for Social Sciences, Centre of Excellence of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 2020.

17 ROODUIJN, M.: What Unites the Voter Bases of Populist Parties? Comparing the Electorates of 15 Populist Parties in Western Europe. In *European Political Science Review*, 2018, Vol. 10, No. 3, p. 351-368.

18 ERNST, N. et al.: Extreme Parties and Populism: An Analysis of Facebook and Twitter across Six Countries. In *Information, Communication & Society*, 2017, Vol. 20, No. 9, p. 1347-1364.

19 For more information, see: AALBERG, T., DE VREESE, C. H.: Introduction: Comprehending Populist Political Communication. In AALBERG, T., ESSER, F., REINEMANN, C. (eds.): *Populist Political Communication in Europe*. New York : Routledge, 2017, p. 3-11; LIPINSKI, A., STEPINSKA, A.: Polish Right-Wing Populisms in the Era of Social Media. In *Problems of Post-Communism*, 2019, Vol. 66, No. 7, p. 71-82; MUDDE, C.: *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2007.

20 Remark by authors: SPD was founded after the split of the Dawn of Direct Democracy of Tomio Okamura and was registered by the Ministry of Interior in June 2015. Like ‘the Dawn’, SPD temporarily bore the leader’s name, as it was called Freedom and Direct Democracy – Tomio Okamura from March 2016 to August 2019.

21 See: SVAČINOVÁ, P.: Poučení z chyb Úsvitu: Svoboda a přímá demokracie. In KOPEČEK, L., HLOUŠEK, V., CHYTILEK, R. (eds.): *Já platím, já rozhoduji! Političtí podnikatelé a jejich strany*. Brno : B&P Publishing, 2018, p. 179-219; CHARVÁTOVÁ, D., NIKLESOVÁ, E.: SPD a tematizace migrace v období před volbami do Evropského parlamentu 2019: Případová studie facebookových příspěvků a výstupů v TV předvolebních debatách. In *Civilia: Odborná revue pro didaktiku společenských věd*, 2020, Vol. 11, No. 2, p. 20-53.

22 SCHULZ, A.: Where Populist Citizens Get the News: An Investigation of News Audience Polarization along Populist Attitudes in 11 Countries. In *Communication Monographs*, 2019, Vol. 86, No. 1, p. 88-111.

be *Facebook*, *Twitter*, or (especially in the case of younger generations) *Instagram*, which is, compared to the other two mentioned, focused primarily on photos and videos, *Facebook*, with its less than 5.6 million users (i.e., 52.5% of the population) in the year 2020, is clearly the most popular social communication platform in the Czech Republic.<sup>23</sup> *Facebook* provides its users with more intense and personalised content, while *Twitter* allows users to remain anonymous and is taken rather as a news source,<sup>24</sup> although not quite exclusively. This is very well known also in Czech society, where *Twitter* operates primarily as a commentator and information channel.<sup>25</sup>

Finally, when analysing SPD's political communication, the high degree of personalisation in the person of the party chairman Tomio Okamura cannot be ignored. Okamura primarily takes care of the party's communication and in the process speaks out against both the public service media and some mainstream media and attacks them. At the same time, Okamura is one of the most active users of social networking sites: he is the author of his own blog and he is also very active on *Facebook*, *Twitter* and *YouTube*. However, at the end of July 2020, his channel on the latter was temporarily cancelled as it depicted criminal offences of migrants because it is against *YouTube*'s rules to publish videos with violent and cruel clips (Okamura promptly created a new one). Later, after Okamura's appeal in September 2020, the original channel was renewed but without two controversial videos.<sup>26</sup> In addition, in mid-July 2020, information appeared on Okamura's *Facebook* profile that *Facebook* was threatening to restrict the publication of news due to violations of the rules. But eventually the report was denied after a few days with the justification that it was only a technical error.<sup>27</sup>

On *Facebook*, Okamura is even the most followed Czech politician (about 264,000 followers in January 2021), in addition to a high percentage of interactions (see Figure 1). In January 2021, for example, Prime Minister Andrej Babiš had about 40,000 fewer followers than Okamura; however, in preceding years he had up to 100,000 fewer. At the same time, the frequency of communication on Okamura's *Facebook* profile is, on a long-term basis, high, as are the sums which Okamura invests into *Facebook* advertising; for example, during the first half of 2020, investment in sponsoring contributions amounted to 14,000 euros.<sup>28</sup>




Chart: Jan Tvrdouš, Deník N • Source: Facebook • Get the data • Created with Datawrapper

Figure 1: Number of interactions on Facebook profiles of parliamentary party leaders

23 See: BENNETT, S. et al.: *Populist Communication on Social Media: Research Report*. Budapest: Centre for Social Sciences, Centre of Excellence of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 2020.

24 ERNST, N. et al.: Extreme Parties and Populism: An Analysis of Facebook and Twitter across Six Countries. In *Information, Communication & Society*, 2017, Vol. 20, No. 9, p. 1347-1364.

25 CHARVÁTOVÁ, D., NIKLESOVÁ, E.: SPD a tematizace migrace v období před volbami do Evropského parlamentu 2019: Případová studie facebookových příspěvků a výstupů v TV předvolebních debatách. In *Civilia: Odborná revue pro didaktiku společenských věd*, 2020, Vol. 11, No. 2, p. 20-53.

26 KLÍMOVÁ, J.: *Okamura má zpět YouTube kanál. Bez dvou videí kvůli nenávisti*. Released on 8<sup>th</sup> September 2020. [online]. [2021-07-09]. Available at: <<https://archiv.hn.cz/c1-66812780-okamura-ma-zpet-youtube-kanal-bez-dvou-videi-kvuli-nenavisti>>.

27 TVRDOŇ, J.: *Cenzura a umlčování názorů? Technická chyba, zdůvodnil Facebook, proč hrozil SPD zrušením stránek*. Released on 20<sup>th</sup> August 2020. [online]. [2021-08-20]. Available at: <<https://denikn.cz/422596/cenzura-a-umlcovani-nazoru-technicka-chyba-zdudnodnil-facebook-proc-hrozil-spd-zrusenim-stranek>>.

28 TVRDOŇ, J.: *Cenzura a umlčování názorů? Technická chyba, zdůvodnil Facebook, proč hrozil SPD zrušením stránek*. Released on 20<sup>th</sup> August 2020. [online]. [2021-08-20]. Available at: <<https://denikn.cz/422596/cenzura-a-umlcovani-nazoru-technicka-chyba-zdudnodnil-facebook-proc-hrozil-spd-zrusenim-stranek>>.

Source: TVRDOŇ, J.: *Ban od Facebooku by Okamura zabolet. Sociální síť ale politikům stránky ruší málokdy*. Released on 15<sup>th</sup> July 2020. [online]. [2021-09-25]. Available at: <<https://denikn.cz/399555/ban-od-facebooku-by-okamura-zabolet-socialni-sit-ale-politikum-stranky-rusi-malokdy>>.

Thus, the single-country case study aims to analyse the pre-election *Facebook* communication of SPD and Tomio Okamura to identify in what manner and to what extent elements of populist political communication are reflected in these statuses. The subject of the research interest is campaigns preceding the parliamentary election in October 2017, European elections in May 2019, and regional elections in September 2020. Under Czech Law (No. 322/2016 Coll.), the election campaign officially begins on the day the election is announced and finishes on the day the election results are announced, with the election announcements having to come no later than 90 days before the beginning of the election, the beginning of the campaign is not, however, defined in detail. The research therefore examines the representation of populist statuses in the final phase of each campaign, i.e., the last fourteen days before the respective elections, when the intensity of campaigning is highest.<sup>29</sup>

Attention is paid particularly to what the main features of populism in Okamura's statuses are and what they refer to. Furthermore, the research focuses on how the 'enemy' is defined, what Okamura's stance is towards political opponents, and how the construct of the people is created and understood. The case study also deals with Okamura and SPD's relationship with the media, and more specifically, with the attacks on the public service media and some mainstream media, as an important element of populist rhetoric is to discredit the media. Last but not least, attention is paid to the argumentation structure and analysis of the style and rhetorical techniques.

The populist media outlets of Tomio Okamura on *Facebook* were investigated using manual quantitative content analysis, where in order for the communication to be evaluated as populist, it must have at least one of the following features: references to the people, elites, 'the others', popular sovereignty, referendum, elements of Euroscepticism, and/or attacks on the media. Shared posts, i.e., posts taken from other people, were excluded from the analysis. Provided that the above-mentioned populist elements were identified in the analysed statuses, the statuses became the object of a critical discourse analysis to determine how populist appeals are being presented to followers. The objects of the research were therefore not only statements, which were, in the given category, used and repeated for the purposes of seeming natural, but also the attitude of Tomio Okamura towards political actors (elites), or how he expresses himself on current social topics.

### 3 Populist Political Communication of SPD

As mentioned above, the research focused on analysing the final phase of campaigning before the three most recent elections held in the Czech Republic (i.e., the 2017 parliamentary, the 2019 European, and the 2020 regional elections). Just on 8<sup>th</sup> October 2017 we can notice a contribution correlating with the above-mentioned criteria for the contribution to be classified populist. It is a transcript of the interview from the *Právo* daily newspaper that was published on the online news portal *Novinky.cz*<sup>30</sup> which resulted in the multiplication of a potential impact of the media message on more recipients. In this interview several mutually intersecting discourse practices were identified.

At the same time, Okamura begins to thematise the dichotomy between 'us' and 'them',<sup>31</sup> which continuously runs through the entire research sample. The category 'us' in this dichotomy represents the attitudes of political representatives of SPD and their supporters that will protect 'our' citizens from 'hateful Islamic ideology' and

29 FILIPEC, O., GARAJ, M., MIHÁLIK, J.: Ako komunikuje pravica: Komunikačné aktivity vybraných (krajne) pravicových politických strán v Českej republike a na Slovensku pred parlamentnými voľbami v rokoch 2016 a 2017. In *Politické vedy*, 2018, Vol. 21, No. 3, p. 183-212.

30 See: MARTINEK, J.: *Okamura: Nechci už být v opozici*. Released on 8<sup>th</sup> October 2017. [online]. [2021-09-25]. Available at: <<https://www.novinky.cz/domaci/clanek/okamura-nechci-uz-byt-v-opozici-40047869>>.

31 Compare to: BARR, R. R.: Populist, Outsiders and Anti-Establishment Politics. In *Party Politics*, 2009, Vol. 15, No. 1, p. 29-48; SANDERS, K., HURTADO, M. J. M., ZORAGASTUA, J.: Populism and Exclusionary Narratives: The 'Other' in Podemos' 2014 European Union Election Campaign. In *European Journal of Communication*, 2017, Vol. 32, No. 6, p. 552-567.

who differ from 'them' (all others), which is other political parties, corrupt elites or dangerous, maladaptive and excluded groups. This is typical of all the three studied periods. For the pre-election communication of SDP an explicit anti-establishment appeal is significant, the law on referendum is required to enable political participation and support people's sovereignty, which should lead towards 'real democracy'.<sup>32</sup>

The populist rhetoric becomes an integral part of the pre-election communication strategy, disrespect and the so-called labelling of political elites also represents one of several possible displays of a delusive argument, the so-called *argumentum ad hominem*, i.e. "personal verbal attack on an opponent (...), for an opponent offending or derogatory reasonings, swear words, curses, etc.".<sup>33</sup> The technique of labelling, when an individual is linked with a negative symbol or meaning may be used because "a label relieves the need to think of who the labelled human is, what they do, what is the sense of what they say. The sense of a label is to make people bite a finger that points somewhere not looking where or what it points at. A label disenfranchises a human being their uniqueness. It makes them a member of a suspicious group; it isolates and scorns them".<sup>34</sup>

Another form of delusive argument, the so-called *argumentum ad baculum*,<sup>35</sup> is also present. This form of delusive argument is characterised by "arousing fear and dread that can help to attain persuasive goals".<sup>36</sup> Czech political representatives are discredited as they are, inter alia, called "those who obviously help to steal this country". Here also comes a typical example of labelling and political branding as in Okamura's Facebook post of 8<sup>th</sup> October 2017:

"We would not like to deal with people who substantially deceived the public or who are absolutely untrustworthy. For example, with Mr. Kalousek or Mr. Sobotka, but this does not threaten to happen as their programmes are pro-Brussels and pro-immigrant. I frankly say that we have a problem to be in a government with a Prime Minister who is criminally charged. Since the very beginning that would be a very unstable situation. Such a government may fall any time and so, the voters should be aware of who they will give their vote to."<sup>37</sup>

Defining 'us', i.e., SPD representatives in the role of protectors who will look after 'our' hard working and decent citizens and after the nation threatened by various dangers (most often migrants and the European Union), is used in a number of cases within the pre-election narrative. The reference to 'our' decent citizens, who need protection is, inter alia, used as an opposition to the vague label of parasites, maladaptive, dangerous, murderers, rapists, etc., as the immigrants are commonly portrayed. This we may read, for example, in Okamura's (above-mentioned) Facebook post of 8<sup>th</sup> October 2017:

"I have learnt in politics that it is your election result that decides. When it is good, which means over ten per cent, our coalition potential will be huge. The parties will be made to promote our programme. Then a situation when other politicians will have to bow to the law on referendum or money only for decent citizens not parasites may come true. Because there is no other choice – it will not be possible without us. That is what we would wish."<sup>38</sup>

Thus, the society is presented as two homogenous and antagonistic groups, i.e., the 'pure people' and the 'corrupt elite'.<sup>39</sup> We can also observe the conception of the "heartland",<sup>40</sup> which is an image of an "idealised place connected with idealised people who derive their virtuous properties and values just from the place where

32 SVAČINOVA, P.: Poučení z chyb Úsvitu: Svoboda a přímá demokracie. In KOPEČEK, L., HLOUŠEK, V., CHYTILEK, R. (eds.): *Já platím, já rozhoduji! Politici podnikatelé a jejich strany*. Brno: B&P Publishing, 2018, p. 179-219.

33 SZYMANEK, K.: *Umění argumentace: Terminologický slovník*. Olomouc: Palacký University, 2003, p. 57.

34 KOUKOLÍK, F., DRTILOVÁ, J.: *Vzpoua deprivantů: Nestvůry, nástroje, obrana*. Prague: Galén, 2006, p. 111.

35 WOODS, J., WALTON, D. N.: *Argument: The Logic of the Fallacies*. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1982, p. 47-54.

36 SZYMANEK, K.: *Umění argumentace: Terminologický slovník*. Olomouc: Palacký University, 2003, p. 55.

37 OKAMURA, T.: *Můj sobotní rozhovor pro deník Právo*. Released on 8<sup>th</sup> October 2017. [online]. [2021-09-25]. Available at: <<https://www.facebook.com/tomio.cz/posts/1771418642868943>>.

38 OKAMURA, T.: *Můj sobotní rozhovor pro deník Právo*. Released on 8<sup>th</sup> October 2017. [online]. [2021-09-25]. Available at: <<https://www.facebook.com/tomio.cz/posts/1771418642868943>>.

39 MUDDE, C.: *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 23.

40 See: TAGGART, P.: *Populism*. Philadelphia: Open University Press, 2000.

they come from".<sup>41</sup> The nationwide topic of the 2020 regional elections was a safe home and the motto 'family first'. Everything was based on the spirit of patriotism and appeal to national values. See, for example, Figure 2 below, which depicts the face of a crying child with a painted national flag. The image is accompanied by the following wording: "Nowadays a racist is called who wants to defend his homeland, moral values, his culture and future... PATRIOTISM IS NORMAL. OUR COUNTRY MUST BE OURS AGAIN!"



Figure 2: An example of a Facebook post with the appeal to patriotism and mobilisation

Source: OKAMURA, T.: *Co si o tom myslíte? Česká republika na 1. místě!* Released on 26<sup>th</sup> September 2020. [online]. [2021-09-25]. Available at: <[https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story\\_fbid=3632499753427480&id=179497582061065](https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=3632499753427480&id=179497582061065)>.

The pre-election communication strategy of SPD is often based on defining itself to (particularly traditional) parties in the Parliament and on putting stress on the distinctness of the political programme, visions, and efforts of SPD.<sup>42</sup> This is often made a topic in connection with the enforcement of prohibition of Islam as a religion, as SPD sees Islam as a radical ideology that "voices hatred toward others". Semantically vague statements are also used, such as "in the situation Europe is now...". At the same time, we can find synonyms with negative connotations piling up and the repetition of words like "ban", "ideology", "hatred", "hate" or "threat" whose goal is to increase the meaning of a report. The technique of repetition is considered one pillar of propaganda.<sup>43</sup> The principle of repetition enhances suggestiveness because the repeated information "stimulate and incite listener's attention".<sup>44</sup>

The frequently repeated loss of sovereignty and the possible denial of political participation due to the Czech Republic's membership in the European Union (EU) is another identifiable feature determining the assignment to the category of populist statuses. The EU is presented in an expressive way as it is characterised as one of the 'symbols of a dictate from outside' (e.g., in the field of refugee reception quotas or the so-called Green Deal with the aim of reducing CO<sub>2</sub> emissions before the 2020 regional election), as a danger that threatens the vaguely defined nation (e.g. with the reference to the so-called *do-good* totalitarianism), or as it embodies the threat to national self-sufficiency, both in terms of agricultural production, food cultivation and rising prices, and industrial production. In this respect, the concept of *populist sovereignty* appears inspiring as the appeals to national sovereignty have become a key aspect and repeating pattern of a populist discourse.<sup>45</sup>

41 KUBÁT, M.: Úvod do studia populismu. In KUBÁT, M., MEJSTRÍK, M., KOCLÁN, J. (eds.): *Populismus v časech krize*. Prague: Karolinum, 2016, p. 19.

42 Remark by authors: Above all, the effort to differ from the Tricolour Movement of Citizens (Tricolour) established in June 2019 by Václav Klaus, Jr. (with the goal to defend conservative values, common sense and workers) can be observed.

43 For the perception of propaganda within the context of political psychology, i.e., influence of media on the decision of voters, etc., see: COTTAM, M. L. et al.: *Introduction to Political Psychology*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers, 2004.

44 LOTKO, E.: *Kapitoly ze současné rétoriky*. Olomouc: Palacký University, 2004, p. 99.

45 See: DE SPIEGELGEIRE, S., SKINNER, C., SWEIJS, T.: *The Rise of Populist Sovereignism: What It Is, Where It Comes from*.

Again, the expressions of negative connotation and/or expressive or generalising expressions without proper argument basis are used. This way of expression, together with the reference to possible threats, may be considered as a typical means of persuasion.<sup>46</sup> This can be illustrated either by Figure 3 below (in the text of which it is stated: “*We are reporting to Brussels: Immigration is not a human right, human right is to live in our country according to our customs*”) or by the following quotation from Okamura’s Facebook post of 17<sup>th</sup> September 2020:

*“In the European Union they have completely gone mad and they carry on building their centralized totalitarian super-state. Brussels wants to destroy the sovereignty of states, their economy and freedom of people and to enforce redistribution of immigrants. As if it is not bad, the economic crisis due to the Covid 19 pandemic, the European Union decided to destroy and finish the economy of European states. Through the words of the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen the EU suggested a 55% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 when compared to 1990. The plan up to now considered 40 per cent... The Union in a Bolshevik way makes a commitment that it will fulfil the plans over 100 per cent and is not interested that this will destroy the economy of the EU states at all. The Green Deal or Great Leap requires sacrifice... What’s more, Brussels, in fact, requires a uniform foreign and immigration policy of the EU and via facti combating the migration opponents! That is totally unacceptable for SPD. The EU does not help but harms. The sooner we get out of it the better!”<sup>47</sup>*



Figure 3: An example of a Facebook post dealing with the so-called Brussels dictate  
Source: OKAMURA, T.: *Co si o tom myslíte? Česká republika na 1. místě!* Released on 1<sup>st</sup> October 2020. [online]. [2021-09-25]. Available at: <[https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story\\_fbid=3742395855771202&id=179497582061065](https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=3742395855771202&id=179497582061065)>.

and What It Means for International Security and Defense. Hague : The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2017; BASILE, L., MAZZOLENI, O.: Sovereignist Wine in Populist Bottles? An Introduction. In *Journal of European Politics and Society*, 2020, Vol. 21, No. 2, p. 151-162. Or, more specifically, concerning SPD in a European comparison, see: BRUSENBAUCH MEISLOVÁ, M., BUCKLEDEE, S.: Discursive (Re)Construction of Populist Sovereignism by Right-Wing Hard Eurosceptic Parties in the 2019 European Parliament Elections. In *Journal of Language and Politics*, 2021, Vol. 20, No. 6, p. 825-851.

46 SZYMANEK, K.: *Umění argumentace: Terminologický slovník*. Olomouc : Palacký University, 2003, p. 241.

47 OKAMURA, T.: *EU nepomáhá, ale škodí*. Released on 17<sup>th</sup> September 2020. [online]. [2021-09-25]. Available at: <[https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story\\_fbid=3736849232992531&id=179497582061065](https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=3736849232992531&id=179497582061065)>.

In all statuses in all examined periods, the communication of SPD is also symptomatic by the explicitly declared Euroscepticism. EU membership is again seen as something that ‘does not help but harms’ (e.g., within the context of the above-mentioned Green Deal and reduction of CO<sub>2</sub>). That is why it is important to ‘get out of’ the EU. Without any argumentative support in relevant sources, there is, for example, a reflection on the alleged future ambition of the EU to create a “*centralized state with its own taxes*”, which supposedly had been supported by Prime Minister Babiš as stated in Okamura’s post of 21<sup>st</sup> September 2020:

*“The European Union has big financial problems and wants to adopt new directly collected taxes that will become its own resource. This is another step toward creation of one centralized state with its own taxes and independent budget. This was unfortunately supported at the last summit also by our Prime Minister Andrej Babiš. SPD rejects the European Union to collect taxes. The money belongs to Czech citizens and not to Brussels! It shows the EU does not help but harms. The sooner we get out of it, the better! (...) Remaining in the EU clearly means the ending of the Czech Republic where we grew up and that we have known for our whole life. It is the ending of the country where we understand each other on the basis of language, and we respect the same cultural, historical, and social values. It is the end of freedom and sovereignty. It is the end of safety and social peace. For SPD I say plainly – we are the only party that advocates a referendum on the exit of the Czech Republic from the EU in order for the citizens themselves to decide about their future in their own country. For my part I say – CZEXIT while there is time! Because the last one will pay the bill.”<sup>48</sup>*

The statuses again use the above-mentioned means of deceptive argumentation, especially the *ad baculum argumentum*, which brings us to the level of irrational, demagogic and hypothetical judgments, because “*intimidation and threat are not factors in rational attitudes*”.<sup>49</sup> SPD repeatedly calls for withdrawal from the EU and newly comes up with proposals for an ‘improved’ project of the Visegrad Group or Visegrad Plus (in its own version of operation) or the possibility of joining the European Free Trade Association as an alternative to EU membership. At the same time, Okamura has a relatively peculiar interpretation of the objectives of this cooperation, as it is possible to read, for example, in his Facebook post from 3<sup>rd</sup> October 2020:

*“The Visegrad Group and Central European states now have real key interests in common. These interests include: 1) preventing mass immigration and the Islamization of our countries, 2) preventing the emergence of a super-state under the hegemony of Germany and France, 3) preserving the European character of our countries against multiculturalism, 4) creating a defensive and geopolitical community between Germany and Russia (and Turkey), as Palacký already understood it, 5) to create an economic community of independent states. We must build this grouping in the event that Western Europe fails to be saved from Islamization and in the event that the EU becomes the United European Emirates. (...) With the advancing Islamization of Western Europe, we must also start working more on the cooperation between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which I would call ‘Visegrad Plus’. That is, the Visegrad countries plus, for example, Austria, Croatia, Slovenia, or Italy, or, if some German states are saved from Islamization, Saxony or Brandenburg...”<sup>50</sup>*

The research also showed that Okamura pursues the ‘stay on message’ strategy of political communication. This is realised through the repetition of identical slogans and party manifesto requirements and points where a significant proportion of these proclamations are closely related to the typical elements of populist rhetoric. Not surprisingly, migration is one of the most important topics in this context. It is migration and Islam that are seen by Okamura as a significant security threat and problem for Czech society and they are often communicated in direct connection with terrorism. Okamura, and therefore SPD, repeatedly draw attention to the dangers associated with migration and Islamization or reiterate their demand for zero tolerance of illegal migration.

48 OKAMURA, T.: *Dnešní aktuality 21. 9. 2020*. Released on 21<sup>st</sup> September 2020. [online]. [2021-09-25]. Available at: <<https://www.facebook.com/tomio.cz/videos/409953676660946>>.

49 SZYMANEK, K.: *Umění argumentace: Terminologický slovník*. Olomouc : Palacký University, 2003, p. 55.

50 OKAMURA, T.: *A co si myslíte Vy? EU nepomáhá, ale škodí*. Released on 3<sup>rd</sup> October 2020. [online]. [2021-09-25]. Available at: <[https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story\\_fbid=3632465486764240&id=179497582061065](https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=3632465486764240&id=179497582061065)>.

However, before the most recent regional election of 2020, in the category of ‘other’ there can also be seen a strong negative appeal to socially excluded groups that harm ‘decent’ people. This was because the more intensive thematization of problems associated with the protection of ‘our people’, i.e., for example, those who are at risk for ‘income poverty’, became an important message in SPD’s pre-election communication. Here, references to ‘the people’ that are, or could be, at risk of poverty are causally associated with the political action of ruling elites, who do not adequately protect ‘our citizens’. In this way, the SPD once again strengthens its dominant (pre-election) narrative of self-styling in the position of ‘protector of the weak and poor’,<sup>51</sup> which is evidenced, for example, by Okamura’s post on *Facebook* from 24<sup>th</sup> September 2020:

*“Instead, we see that Babiš’s government is about to pump borrowed billions into the economy by passing money to rich multinational corporations. On behalf of the SPD movement, I say that it would be nice if the government also offered some tangible help to those who really and urgently need it. If you see it the same way, please support the SPD next week in the regional and Senate elections. Thank you!”<sup>52</sup>*

As for Okamura’s self-presentation itself, it can be stated that Okamura tends to a hyperbolic way of speaking and he also often tends to use demagogic considerations and propaganda tactics, such as the aforementioned principle of repeating, ‘branding’ political opponents, etc. Okamura’s *Facebook* posts are most often concluded with an agitated call to participate in elections, in which the level of voluntary modality is present,<sup>53</sup> and the need to make a change is expressed, because the current government has ‘failed’. Many of Okamura’s posts are untruthful and/or are formulated in a persuasive, or even manipulative, way. Moreover, by their nature and content, they often incite ethnic, racial and religious hatred. For example, migrants are predominantly portrayed in a negative light, most often as murderers, rapists and violent criminals, which is built on the reasoning to cause feelings of fear and the need to mobilise and defend borders in his followers. This is also connected with the negation of the EU membership. The EU membership is seen as a significant cause for the inability to implement national policy at the national level, etc., which is why, for example, the 2019 European elections were presented as a referendum on immigration and EU membership by Okamura and other leading representatives of SPD.

## 4 Conclusion

The present single-country case study was focused on the analysis of the *Facebook* communication of SPD and Tomio Okamura during the final phase of the campaigns leading up to the Parliamentary election in October 2017, the European election in May 2019, and the regional elections in October 2020. Its objective was to examine the presence of elements of populist political communication in the respective posts. At the same time, the research looked at how the category of ‘the others’ was presented in Okamura’s *Facebook* political communication. Emphasis was put on the protection of honest and working citizens, the protection of ‘our’ families with children from the threats of maladjusted, non-working citizens, as well as ‘outsiders’ (i.e., migration).

As a result, six categories of migration were identified, which SPD includes in their populist political communication: Islam/Islamization, immigration, immigrants, immigrant culture, foreign policy, and SPD and its fight against migration. All these topics were based on the SPD’s manifesto. It is therefore legitimate

51 For more details on mobilising grievances in contemporary Czech politics, whether they are real or imagined, see: MAŠKARINEC, P., BLÁHA, P.: For Whom the Bell Tolls: Grievance Theory and the Rise of New Political Parties in the 2010 and 2013 Czech Parliamentary Elections. In *Sociológia – Slovak Sociological Review*, 2014, Vol. 46, No. 6, p. 706-731; CHARVÁT, J., MAŠKARINEC, P.: The Middle Class and Changes in Voting Behaviour. In TUNGUL, L. (ed.): *Middle Class at a Crossroads*. Přerov : Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, and TOPAZ, 2019, p. 56-67. [online]. [2021-09-25]. Available at: <<https://top-az.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/ENG-Stredni-trida-WEB-2.pdf>>.

52 OKAMURA, T.: *Dnesní aktuální 24. 9. 2020*. Released on 24<sup>th</sup> September 2020. [online]. [2021-09-25]. Available at: <<https://www.facebook.com/tomio.cz/videos/1070717073348532>>.

53 ŽAŽA, S.: *Voluntativní modalita*. [online]. [2021-09-25]. Available at: <[https://www.czechency.org/slovník/VOLUNTATIVNÍ\\_MODALITA](https://www.czechency.org/slovník/VOLUNTATIVNÍ_MODALITA)>.

to talk about a considerable overlap between the SPD’s platform on the one hand and its rhetoric and political communication on the other hand. In addition, all these themes intersect across all three monitored periods. But, in particular, the themes of migration and Euroscepticism were heavily emphasised.

To sum up, SPD uses populism as an effective communication strategy, which brings the party repeated success in different types of elections. The party’s political communication was, in addition, greatly personalised by the party leader Tomio Okamura and it takes place particularly on social networking sites, especially *Facebook*, which seems to be a suitable platform for the success of populist political communication. In accordance with the general definitions of populism, SPD managed to bring together, within the fictitious category of ‘ordinary people’, various parts of society whose opinions differ significantly. It is not, therefore, populism as a value that functions as the ideological link, but different sources of dissatisfaction with the elites, which can be simplified and hidden in a populist style of political communication. This connection can be, however, realised through the mobilisation of various types of grievances (political, economic or ethnic), whether they are real or imagined. It seems that connecting diverse social groups through populism is an effective strategic reaction to the fragmentation of (not only Czech) society. Or in other words, given the prevailing mistrust in the political elites, the populists’ questioning approach appears to have a significant mobilization effect.

*Acknowledgment: The submitted single-country case study is a partial output of the research project “Nativist Tendencies in Populist Political Communication of the SPD” (project code E83-97) financed by the Internal Grant System of the Metropolitan University Prague. This study is the result of Metropolitan University Prague research project No. 93-01 “Political Science, Media and Anglophone Studies” (2022) based on a grant from the Institutional Fund for the Long-Term Strategic Development of Research Organisations.*

## BIBLIOGRAPHY:

- AALBERG, T. et al.: *Populist Political Communication in Europe*. New York : Routledge, 2017.
- AALBERG, T., DE VREESE, C. H.: Introduction: Comprehending Populist Political Communication. In BASILE, L., MAZZOLENI, O. (eds.): *Sovereignist Wine in Populist Bottles? An Introduction*. In *Journal of European Politics and Society*, 2020, Vol. 21, No. 2, p. 151-162. ISSN 2374-5118.
- BARR, R. R.: Populist, Outsiders and Anti-Establishment Politics. In *Party Politics*, 2009, Vol. 15, No. 1, p. 29-48. ISSN 1460-3683.
- BENNETT, S. et al.: *Populist Communication on Social Media: Research Report*. Budapest : Centre for Social Sciences, Centre of Excellence of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 2020.
- BRACCIALE, R., MARTELLA, A.: Define the Populist Political Communication Style: The Case of Italian Political Leaders on Twitter. In *Information, Communication & Society*, 2017, Vol. 20, No. 9, p. 1310-1329. ISSN 1468-4462.
- BRUSENBAUCH MEISLOVÁ, M., BUCKLEDEE, S.: Discursive (Re)Construction of Populist Sovereignism by Right-Wing Hard Eurosceptic Parties in the 2019 European Parliament Elections. In *Journal of Language and Politics*, 2021, Vol. 20, No. 6, p. 825-851. ISSN 1569-2159.
- CANOVAN, M.: Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy. In *Political Studies*, 1999, Vol. 47, No. 1, p. 2-16. ISSN 0032-3217.
- CANOVAN, M.: Taking Politics to the People: Populism as the Ideology of Democracy. In MÉNY, Y., SUREL, Y. (eds.): *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*. London : Palgrave, 2002, p. 25-44.
- CHARVÁT, J., MAŠKARINEC, P.: The Middle Class and Changes in Voting Behaviour. In TUNGUL, L. (ed.): *Middle Class at a Crossroads*. Přerov : Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, and TOPAZ, 2019, p. 56-67. [online]. [2021-09-25]. Available at: <<https://top-az.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/ENG-Stredni-trida-WEB-2.pdf>>.
- CHARVÁTOVÁ, D., NIKLESOVÁ, E.: SPD a tematizace migrace v období před volbami do Evropského parlamentu 2019: Případová studie facebookových příspěvků a výstupů v TV předvolebních debatách. In *Civilia: Odborná revue pro didaktiku společenských věd*, 2020, Vol. 11, No. 2, p. 20-53. ISSN 1805-3963.
- COTTAM, M. L. et al.: *Introduction to Political Psychology*. Mahwah, NJ : Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers, 2004.

- DESPIEGELGEIRE, S., SKINNER, C., SWEIJS, T.: *The Rise of Populist Sovereignism: What It Is, Where It Comes from, and What It Means for International Security and Defense*. Hague : The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2017.
- ENGESSER, S. et al.: Populism and Social Media: How Politicians Spread a Fragmented Ideology. In *Information, Communication & Society*, 2017, Vol. 20, No. 8, p. 1109-1126. ISSN 1468-4462.
- ERNST, N. et al.: Extreme Parties and Populism: An Analysis of Facebook and Twitter across Six Countries. In *Information, Communication & Society*, 2017, Vol. 20, No. 9, p. 1347-1364. ISSN 1468-4462.
- ERNST, N. et al.: Populists Prefer Social Media over Talk Shows: An Analysis of Populist Messages and Stylistic Elements across Six Countries. In *Social Media + Society*, 2019, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 1-14. ISSN 2056-3051.
- FILIPEC, O., GARAJ, M., MIHÁLIK, J.: Ako komunikuje pravica: Komunikačné aktivity vybraných (krajne) pravicových politických strán v Českej republike a na Slovensku pred parlamentnými voľbami v rokoch 2016 a 2017. In *Politické vedy*, 2018, Vol. 21, No. 3, p. 183-212. ISSN 1335-2741.
- HAVLÍK, V., PINKOVÁ, A.: Seeking a Theoretical Framework: How to Define and Identify Populist Parties? In HAVLÍK, V. (ed.): *Populist Political Parties in East-Central Europe*. Brno : Masaryk University, 2012, p. 17-37.
- JAGERS, J., WALGRAVE, S.: Populism as Political Communication Style: An Empirical Study of Political Parties Discourse in Belgium. In *European Journal of Political Research*, 2007, Vol. 46, No. 3, p. 319-345. ISSN 1475-6765.
- KLÍMOVÁ, J.: *Okamura má zpět YouTube kanál. Bez dvou videí kvůli nenávisti*. Released on 8<sup>th</sup> September 2020. [online]. [2021-07-09]. Available at: <<https://archiv.hn.cz/c1-66812780-okamura-ma-zpet-youtube-kanal-bez-dvou-vidci-kvuli-nenavisti>>.
- KOUKOLÍK, F., DRTILOVÁ, J.: *Vzpouza deprivantů: Nestvůry, nástroje, obrana*. Prague : Galén, 2006.
- KREIS, R.: The “Tweet Politics” of President Trump. In *Journal of Language and Politics*, 2017, Vol. 16, No. 4, p. 607-618. ISSN 1569-2159.
- KUBÁT, M.: Úvod do studia populismu. In KUBÁT, M., MEJSTRÍK, M., KOCIÁN, J. (eds.): *Populismus v časech krize*. Prague : Karolinum, 2016, p. 12-23.
- LIPÍŇSKI, A., STEPIŇSKA, A.: Polish Right-Wing Populisms in the Era of Social Media. In *Problems of Post-Communism*, 2019, Vol. 66, No. 7, p. 71-82. ISSN 1075-8216.
- LOTKO, E.: *Kapitoly ze současné rétoriky*. Olomouc : Palacký University, 2004.
- LOWNDES, J.: Trump and the Populist Presidency. In OSTIGUY, P., PANIZZA, F., MOFFITT, B. (eds.): *Populism in Global Perspective: A Performative and Discursive Approach*. New York, London : Routledge, 2021, p. 118-135.
- MARTINEK, J.: *Okamura: Nechci už být v opozici*. Released on 8<sup>th</sup> October 2017. [online]. [2021-09-25]. Available at: <<https://www.novinky.cz/domaci/clanek/okamura-nechci-uz-byt-v-opozici-40047869>>.
- MAŠKARINEC, P., BLÁHA, P.: For Whom the Bell Tolls: Grievance Theory and the Rise of New Political Parties in the 2010 and 2013 Czech Parliamentary Elections. In *Sociológia – Slovak Sociological Review*, 2014, Vol. 46, No. 6, p. 706-731. ISSN 0049-1225.
- MOFFITT, B.: *The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style, and Representation*. Stanford : Stanford University Press, 2016.
- MOFFITT, B.: Populism 2.0: Social Media and the False Allure of ‘Unmediated’ Representation. In FITZI, G., MACKERT, J., TURNER, S. T. (eds.): *Populism and the Crisis of Democracy. Volume 2: Politics, Social Movements*. London : Routledge, 2019, p. 30-46.
- MOFFITT, B., TORMEY, S.: Rethinking Populism: Politics, Mediatisation and Political Style. In *Political Studies*, 2014, Vol. 62, No. 2, p. 381-397. ISSN 1467-9248.
- MONTGOMERY, M.: Populism in Performance? Trump on the Stump and His Audience. In *Journal of Language and Politics*, 2020, Vol. 19, No. 5, p. 733-765. ISSN 1569-2159.
- MUDDE, C.: The Populist Zeitgeist. In *Government and Opposition*, 2004, Vol. 39, No. 4, p. 541-563. ISSN 1477-7053.
- MUDDE, C.: *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- MUDDE, C., KALTWASSER, C. R.: *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2017.
- MUDDE, C., KALTWASSER, C. R.: Studying Populism in Comparative Perspective: Reflections on the Contemporary and Future Research Agenda. In *Comparative Political Studies*, 2018, Vol. 51, No. 13, p. 1667-1693. ISSN 1667-1693.
- NAXERA, V. et al.: To Protect National Sovereignty from the EU? The 2019 EP Elections and Populist Parties in V4 Countries. In *UNISCI Journal*, 2020, Vol. 54, No. 3, p. 71-106. ISSN 2386-9453.
- OKAMURA, T.: *Můj sobotní rozhovor pro deník Právo*. Released on 8<sup>th</sup> October 2017. [online]. [2021-09-25]. Available at: <<https://www.facebook.com/tomio.cz/posts/1771418642868943>>.
- OKAMURA, T.: *EU nepomáhá, ale škodí*. Released on 17<sup>th</sup> September 2020. [online]. [2021-09-25]. Available at: <[https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story\\_fbid=3736849232992531&id=179497582061065](https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=3736849232992531&id=179497582061065)>.
- OKAMURA, T.: *Dnešní aktualita 21. 9. 2020*. Released on 21<sup>st</sup> September 2020. [online]. [2021-09-25]. Available at: <<https://www.facebook.com/tomio.cz/videos/409953676660946>>.
- OKAMURA, T.: *Dnešní aktualita 24. 9. 2020*. Released on 24<sup>th</sup> September 2020. [online]. [2021-09-25]. Available at: <<https://www.facebook.com/tomio.cz/videos/1070717073348532>>.
- OKAMURA, T.: *Co si o tom myslíte? Česká republika na 1. místě!* Released on 26<sup>th</sup> September 2020. [online]. [2021-09-25]. Available at: <[https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story\\_fbid=3632499753427480&id=179497582061065](https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=3632499753427480&id=179497582061065)>.
- OKAMURA, T.: *Co si o tom myslíte? Česká republika na 1. místě!* Released on 1<sup>st</sup> October 2020. [online]. [2021-09-25]. Available at: <[https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story\\_fbid=3742395855771202&id=179497582061065](https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=3742395855771202&id=179497582061065)>.
- OKAMURA, T.: *A co si myslíte Vy? EU nepomáhá, ale škodí*. Released on 3<sup>rd</sup> October 2020. [online]. [2021-09-25]. Available at: <[https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story\\_fbid=3632465486764240&id=179497582061065](https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=3632465486764240&id=179497582061065)>.
- OLIVER, J. E., RAHN, W. M.: Rise of the Trumpenvolk: Populism in the 2016 Elections. In *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, 2016, Vol. 667, No. 1, p. 189-206. ISSN 1552-3349.
- OSWALD, M.: Populismus in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika. In LAMMERT, C., SIEWERT, M. B., VORMANN, B. (eds.): *Handbuch Politik USA*. Wiesbaden : Springer VS, 2020, p. 55-72.
- POSTILL, J.: Populism and Social Media: A Global Perspective. In *Media, Culture & Society*, 2018, Vol. 40, No. 5, p. 754-765. ISSN 1460-3675.
- REINEMANN, C. et al.: Populist Political Communication: Toward a Model of Its Causes, Forms, and Effects. In AALBERG, T., ESSER, F., STRÖMBÄCK, J. (eds.): *Populist Political Communication in Europe*. New York : Routledge, 2017, p. 12-28.
- ROODUIJN, M.: What Unites the Voter Bases of Populist Parties? Comparing the Electorates of 15 Populist Parties in Western Europe. In *European Political Science Review*, 2018, Vol. 10, No. 3, p. 351-368. ISSN 1755-7739.
- SANDERS, K., HURTADO, M. J. M., ZORAGASTUA, J.: Populism and Exclusionary Narratives: The ‘Other’ in Podemos’ 2014 European Union Election Campaign. In *European Journal of Communication*, 2017, Vol. 32, No. 6, p. 552-567. ISSN 1460-3705.
- SCHNEIKER, A.: Populist Leadership: The Superhero Donald Trump as Savior in Times of Crisis. In *Political Studies*, 2020, Vol. 68, No. 4, p. 857-874. ISSN 1467-9248.
- SCHULZ, A.: Where Populist Citizens Get the News: An Investigation of News Audience Polarization along Populist Attitudes in 11 Countries. In *Communication Monographs*, 2019, Vol. 86, No. 1, p. 88-111. ISSN 1479-5787.
- STANLEY, B.: The Thin Ideology of Populism. In *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 2008, Vol. 13, No. 1, p. 95-110. ISSN 1469-9613.
- ŠVAČINOVÁ, P.: Poučení z chyb Úsvitu: Svoboda a přímá demokracie. In KOPEČEK, L., HLOUŠEK, V., CHYTILEK, R. (eds.): *Já platím, já rozhoduji! Politici podnikatelé a jejich strany*. Brno : B&P Publishing, 2018, p. 179-219.
- SZYMANEK, K.: *Umění argumentace: Terminologický slovník*. Olomouc : Palacký University, 2003.
- TAGGART, P.: *Populism*. Philadelphia : Open University Press, 2000.
- TAGGART, P.: Populism and Representative Politics in Contemporary Europe. In *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 2004, Vol. 9, No. 3, p. 269-288. ISSN 1356-9317.
- TVRDOŇ, J.: „Cenzura a umlčování názorů“? Technická chyba, zdůvodnil Facebook, proč hrozil SPD zrušením stránek. Released on 20<sup>th</sup> August 2020. [online]. [2021-08-20]. Available at: <<https://denikn.cz/422596/cenzura-a-umlcovani-nazoru-technicka-chyba-zdudodnil-facebook-proc-hrozil-spd-zrusenim-stranek>>.
- TVRDOŇ, J.: *Ban od Facebooku by Okamuru zabořil. Sociální síť ale politikům stránky ruší málokdy*. Released on 15<sup>th</sup> July 2020. [online]. [2021-09-25]. Available at: <<https://denikn.cz/399555/ban-od-facebooku-by-okamuru-zaboril-socialni-sit-ale-politikum-stranky-rusi-malokdy>>.
- WEYLAND, K.: Populism: A Political-Strategic Approach. In KALTWASSER, C. R., TAGGART, P., ESPEJO, P. O. (eds.): *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 48-72.
- WHITE, J. K.: Donald Trump and the Scourge of Populism. In *The Forum. A Journal of Applied Research in Contemporary Politics*, 2016, Vol. 14, No. 3, p. 265-279. ISSN 1540-8884.
- WODAK, R., KRZYŻANOWSKI, M.: Right-Wing Populism in Europe & USA: Contesting Politics & Discourse beyond “Orbanism” and “Trumpism”. In *Journal of Language and Politics*, 2017, Vol. 16, No. 4, p. 471-484. ISSN 1569-2159.

WOODS, J., WALTON, D. N.: *Argument: The Logic of the Fallacies*. Toronto : McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1982.

ŽAŽA, S.: *Voluntativní modalita*. [online]. [2021-09-25]. Available at: <[https://www.czechency.org/slovník/VOLUNTATIVNÍ\\_MODALITA](https://www.czechency.org/slovník/VOLUNTATIVNÍ_MODALITA)>.

